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antero-pit. was also strong. The thyroid influence was high and the adrenal influence low. The spirochaete pallida (I seem to remember that Nietzsche died of G. P. I.) is not considered.

Darwin was hyper-pituitary with the anterior portion overbalancing the posterior; the thyroid was hyperactive and the adrenals sub-standard. It is asserted that his best health was after the twilight of the gonads.

Florence Nightingale and Oscar Wilde, in curious juxtaposition, close this chapter.

In a concluding chapter a strong plea is made for endowed research work on the ground that the race has much to gain therefrom. Particularly is it urged in connection with criminology. When one considers the importance the author assigns to these organs, it is easy to understand how he considers that the hopes of future generations are bound up with endocrinology.

The foregoing will give a fair idea of the compass and the tenor of the book. It is written with the enthusiasm of the thyroid dominant type and due allowance must be made therefor. It is well to read as a corrective the work of some ante-pituitary types, say Schaeffer or Cushing. This is necessary with a good deal of the literature at present being put out on this subject, whether it have the commercial laboratory as its origin, or is the honest belief of an enthusiast.

The character readings remind us forcibly of the phrenologists of our youth when Dr. Fowler traveled the circuit. The classification of types takes us back to the days when humoral doctrines ruled and one heard of sanguine, lymphatic, choleric or melancholic temperaments. Our posterity may regard it with the same amused indulgence. The author is not at all blind to the extravagances of other enthusiasts. He is quick to find flaws in the Freudian armor and to stick a dart in from time to time. Apropos, it is interesting to compare Berman with Kempf on Darwin.

The style is vivid and energetic, what the author himself might term "jazzy." Distinctly aimed for a general reading public rather than a professional one, it lacks the dignity of the orthodox scientific work and partakes somewhat of Ring Lardner's style. It abounds in vulgarisms such as "boob," barbarisms such as, "then he embarked for New York without a word of American, learning English aboard," and impudently split infinitives, such as "for food to just happen along." Still, when all is said and done, it is what Mr. Pepys would have called "a mighty pleasant book," by a man who knows his subject. It is full of facts, and if you maintain a judicial attitude while reading it, you will take no harm of it.

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FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHIATRY. By William A. White. Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series No. 32. New York and Washington: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Company. Pp. 136. \$3.00.

In the preface to this admirable monograph Dr. White tells us that it is his purpose to formulate a *Philosophy of Psychiatry*. "I

have undertaken this broad philosophical approach to psychiatry because of my conviction that only by an illumination of the foundations of the principles of psychiatry can a full understanding of them be had and only when that is accomplished will much wrong thinking about them be in the way of correction" (p. viii). Dr. White's philosophical effort is timely. Little by little the accumulation of facts and principles in the genetic and abnormal fields has been forcing psychology to modify its traditional conceptions until today the patched and makeshift condition of our theoretical structure has become a matter of general concern. We are in great need of synthetic general conceptions which may give center and orientation to our studies—in all branches of psychology.

Dr. White, with characteristic vigor, drives straight at the heart of the really central modern problem—the nature of individuality. After a brief introductory chapter he leads us into a study of "The Unity of the Organism." Here we are made familiar with the notion of the "organism as a whole." It is this conception, we are told, which needs to be emphasized in modern psychiatry. The philosopher Kant, as Dr. White observes (p. 12), advances the concept that "the cause of the existence of every part of a living organism is contained in the whole." There is more truth in this than even Dr. White realizes, and a reading of Kant's latest followers would show that they have never ceased to advance truly organic and genetic conceptions—albeit, they have been accused of "a priori" metaphysics and have been said to be unscientific. But in the field of "science," as our author correctly observes, mechanical and "elementalist" methods have prevailed. This is true even in biology itself, where organic and vitalistic views are the exception. We must get away from a narrow mechanism. If we are to understand the nature of human—and psychical—individuality, we must have our attention upon the *unity* of our being, physiological and mental. "The organism in its totality"—White quotes Ritter with approval—"is as essential to an explanation of its elements as its elements are to an explanation of the organism."

There is in the concrete human individual a principle of unity or wholeness. This is not a separate entity over and above the sum of parts found in the whole, but is the function of the whole itself, acting as a whole. The whole is, like the part, something of an abstraction, for "neither the whole nor the parts have any separate existence" (p. 13). This unifying principle, which is exercised by the organism as a whole, is called by White the *function of integration*. In his discussion of integration and structural development our author follows Childs (p. 16 f.), whose theory of "dynamic gradients" and of structural modification resulting from the interaction of the primitive organism with its environment is beginning to make a real impression in psychological circles. The Chicago physiologists deserve watching. White emphasizes the notion that the organism has been an *organism* from the beginning, that the integrative principle has been operative throughout the evolutionary process, that "the history of the head end, the head, the psyche then reaches as far back as the history of life itself in fact is coterminous with that of life" (p. 22). From the

action of the principle of integration, through the structural modifications which it entails, results *individualization*. As we go higher and higher in the scale of life differentiation becomes more pronounced and more specific. This holds also in the psychological and sociological levels. "It is to this tendency to more specific differentiation that the term *individuation* applies, a process the increasing specificity of which in the higher organisms, such as man, differentiates each member of the species as distinct, because different, from every other member" (p. 24).

But the organism is not a self-contained structure. It must be understood in relation to its environment, and hence in terms of conflict and opposing forces. In his third chapter, accordingly, we find our author emphasizing the *principle of ambivalence*. Any system, we are told, following Le Chatelier, "tends to change so as to minimize an external disturbance." Examples of this internal adjustment in the physical sphere are cited. This tendency of a system to defend itself against external disturbance is even more evident in the physiological and biological fields. Here the tendency of the organism to maintain itself is shown in the adaptations of structure and response so familiar in evolutionary theory. The same notion can, with even more force, be applied to mind. "Every dynamic situation, therefore, can be resolved into two component factors, namely, a force tending to produce motion in a given direction and a force opposed to it tending to produce motion in the diametrically opposite direction. Such a situation occurring in a living organism is termed a *conflict*, and the two opposing forces are designated as *ambivalent opposites*" (p. 31). The organism must maintain its unity against the push and pull of environmental forces and in this struggle mental activity is most characteristically revealed. It seems to the reviewer that Dr. White might have deepened his conception here, noting that the activity which we call "attention" is no other than the equilibrium-maintaining process of the organism itself. He does note, however, that consciousness reflects the struggle or conflict going on within the individual. "All the organic functioning parts of the human organism are related and find their final and highest expression in symbolic patterns which set forth the tendencies of the organism as a whole in what are called psychological terms" (p. 34).

In his discussion of conflict our author takes a cue from Bergson and shows that "side by side with the tendencies that are making for progress, development, evolution, differentiation, there can be recognized evidences of other factors at work making for dissolution, for dedifferentiation, and that these two sets of factors can advantageously also be considered as ambivalent opposites leading in directions which make ultimately for death or for life" (p. 40). This set of considerations would apply excellently to an interpretation of habit in its negative aspects.

Dr. White passes on to a consideration of the "Stratification of the Organism." If we consider the human individual as an organism actively interacting with its environment we are forced to adopt the Bergsonian conception of consciousness as "virtual action" (p. 48).

Psychological reaction is the reaction of the organism as a whole. "Psychology has ceased to deal with partial reactions and can only reply by stating the psychological correlate of the total tendency, the tendency of the man as a whole; and to this tendency expressed psychologically the term *wish* is applied. The wish then has become the unit of consciousness and has replaced the sensation of the older psychologists" (p. 49).

Our units of consciousness, physiologically, are specific reaction mechanisms, and the grouping, placing, integrating of these into higher systems and into the whole is the great problem of psychology. The human organism, from this analytical point of view, is found to be an integrated mass of mechanisms of different levels—logically and biologically—of development. There are the primitive tendencies of the vegetative system, the reflex mechanisms and sensori-motor coöordinations of the perceptual system, and the later and higher action systems which in part integrate and dominate the lower. This complex mass of tendencies must be kept in equilibrium, continually reintegrated. In this lies the problem of mind. In the main, however, the characteristic problems of psychiatry belong, not to the physiological level, but to the psycho-social sphere. Abnormality is revealed in the inability of the individual to maintain his organic efficiency in his social environment. "Mental disease is disease at the level of integration of the individual and society. It is not a disease of society as such nor yet of man as an individual solely, it is a disease of man as a social animal, it touches him in his social integrations" (p. 72).

Psychiatry is dealing, then, with "higher forms of integration," and these higher forms, Dr. White insists, can never be explained by the lower. He attacks materialism and naturalism on this point, quoting Schiller at length. From this point forward our author passes into the details of psychoanalysis, showing the bearings of his fundamental concepts in special problems and inquiries. We need not follow him into the familiar conceptions of psychoanalysis. Enough has been said, perhaps, to indicate the general nature and direction of Dr. White's philosophy of individuality. He is, distinctly, an Aristotelian. It is curious how, in recent years, Aristotelian conceptions have been forcing themselves upon the psychological world. In my opinion they alone have sufficient synthetic power to serve as central conceptions in the modern science of psychology.

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THE TREND OF THE RACE—A study of Present Tendencies in the Biological Development of Civilized Mankind. By *Samuel J. Holmes*. Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1921. Pp. 396. \$4.00 net.

This volume aims to bring to the layman a summary of results of scientific study in relation to forces that are modifying the inherited qualities of civilized man. It includes 16 chapters, among which are four regarding the problems of inheritance. The portion of the volume that will be of most immediate interest to students of Criminology